บทความวิชาการ

ความมั่นคงภิวัฒน์และผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรียในปี 2015: วิเคราะห์เปรียบเทียบระหว่างสภาพยุโรปและตุรกี

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บทความนี้มุ่งศึกษาลักษณะแนวทางที่สหภาพยุโรปและตุรกีจัดการกับผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรียในปี 2015 โดยใช้กรอบวิเคราะห์ความมั่นคงภิวัฒน์ขององค์กรโคเปนเฮเกนในการวิเคราะห์ข้อมูลจากเอกสาร กระบวนการทั้งสองทำให้เห็นข้อกลับกันว่า ในขณะที่สหภาพยุโรปได้ทำให้ประเด็นผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรียเป็นปัญหาความมั่นคงในปี 2015-2016 โดยมีเป้าหมายเพื่อจัดการกับภัยคุกคามที่พวกเขาเกี่ยวข้องในทางกลับกันเครือภัยที่มีได้ทำให้ประเด็นดังกล่าวเป็นภัยความมั่นคงแต่กลับใช้วาทกรรมมนุษยธรรมว่าด้วย "แขกบ้านแขกเรือน" สำหรับการจัดการกับผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรีย อย่างไรก็ตามในทางปฏิบัติได้ดำเนินการในทางปฏิบัติตัวการบังคับใช้มาตรการต่าง ๆ เพื่อควบคุมชายแดน ดังนั้น เพื่อสร้างสัญญาณข้อถกเถียงต้องการควบคุมความมั่นคงภิวัฒน์ของการจัดการกับการลี้ภัยที่สหภาพยุโรปและตุรกี ความมั่นคงภิวัฒน์ที่แตกต่างกันมีผลกระทบกับการทำงานที่ความมั่นคงระหว่างประเทศหรือไม่ อย่างไร ในการนี้ผู้ศึกษาใช้บริบท ตัวแสดงกรอบการ การเคลื่อนประเด็นความมั่นคง ผลลัพธ์ทางนโยบาย และผู้รับสารเป็นจุดเปรียบเทียบ ผลของการศึกษาพบว่า ลักษณะการทำงานนโยบายความมั่นคงภิวัฒน์ของทั้งสองฝ่ายที่ปรากฏข้อความที่ไม่ลงตัวกันในหลายระดับส่งผลทั้งให้ความมั่นคงระหว่างสูงกับสภาพยุโรปที่เกี่ยวกับภัยคุกคามซีเรียและความมั่นคงผู้ลี้ภัยซีเรียไม่เป็นไปอย่างเป็นรูปธรรมก็ได้และจะยังไม่ใช่นโยบายดังกล่าวความมั่นคงภัยคุกคามข้อกฏหมายการจัดการกับผู้ลี้ภัยที่สหภาพยุโรปและตุรกี ที่มีความผันผวนที่สูงและที่เกี่ยวกับสิ่งเหล่านี้ ความมั่นคงภิวัฒน์ที่สุจริตทำการจัดการกับการลี้ภัยที่สหภาพยุโรปและตุรกีมีความผันผวนสูงและเป็นปัญหาการไม่ปกติ ดูเหมือนจะมีและจะยังไม่ใช่นโยบายดังกล่าวรวมถึงว่าปัญหาผู้ลี้ภัยซีเรียมากขึ้นในกรอบของกฎหมายมนุษยธรรมและสิทธิมนุษยชนที่เกี่ยวกับการรักษา ดังนั้นองค์การที่สนับสนุนด้านกฎหมายมนุษยธรรมควรคำนึงถึงข้อตกลงระหว่างสูงกับสภาพยุโรปในปี 2016 และถ้าต้องให้สภาพยุโรปปรับนโยบายมนุษยธรรมเป็นเป้าหมายหลักมากกว่าการให้เป็นเกิดความมั่นคงทางสังคมและทางกฎหมาย ขณะเดียวกันก็ต้องรักษาความมั่นคงและความปลอดภัยของผู้ลี้ภัยซีเรียระหว่างการเดินทางไปประเทศที่หางทางแทนเรื่องการกักตัวไม่เป็นผลกับผู้ลี้ภัยจำนวนมาก

คำสำคัญ: ความมั่นคงระหว่างสูงกับสภาพยุโรป, ความมั่นคงภิวัฒน์, ผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรีย
Securitization of Syrian Refugees in 2015: A Comparative Analysis between the EU and Turkey

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Abstract

This paper attempts to examine the way in which the European Union (EU) and Turkey dealt with the Syrian refugees in 2015 by employing a securitization framework pioneered by the Copenhagen School. It is argued that while the EU and some of its member states managed to securitize Syrian refugees in 2015-2016 in order to protect the Schengen Zone, Turkey, on the other hands, desecuritized the issue by framing Syrians as a guest in a humanitarian discourse. However, Turkish securitizing actors practically implemented securitization, as a result of the EU influence, through a number of measures in order to control the border. The paper, therefore, seeks to compare and contrast the EU and Turkey’s ways of dealing with Syrian refugee crisis and find out whether different pattern of securitization matters for their positive and sustainable relationship. In doing so, it takes context, actor, securitizing move, policy output, and audience as points of comparison. The study unveils that their securitization undertakings that had been seen as discordant in many layers contributed to the volatility and unusual development of Turkey-EU relations in 2015-2016. Turkey did not and is unlikely to utilize the securitization policy until unless the refugee crisis moves beyond humanitarian limits and becomes connected to terrorism. Thus, humanitarian-based organizations should question the 2016 Turkey-EU deal and advocate the EU to prefer an open door policy instead of its securitization. At the same time, they should also urge Turkey to facilitate safety for the refugees that are heading for their destinations instead of implementing destructive containment policy.

Keywords: Turkey-EU relations, Securitization, Syrian refugees
Introduction

The Syrian refugee crisis can be seen as the problem of forced migration and internal displacement (Adelman, 2001; Betts, 2009), which became one of the most severe humanitarian disaster of mankind since the Cold War (Amnesty, 2015; Tobia, 2015). Mainstream media had also paid attention, though not sufficient, to the ongoing civil war in Syria and its consequences. Though the outset of the civil war sparked in 2011, a massive number of Syrian refugees dramatically increased from late 2014 and had consequently a huge impact on the Turkey and the EU. Significantly, Turkey is expected to be an immigration state in anytime soon (İçduygu, 2015b; Kirisci, 2003; Sirkeci, 2013). In 2015, it is reported that Syrian refugees had unprecedentedly crossed Turkish borders for more than 2.5 million persons and reached European countries in a gigantic number (BBC, 2015d). Under this circumstance, the EU had identified Turkey as a main gateway for the refugees to get across to Europe. This phenomenon had caused the EU and its members an overwhelming worry about a collapse of the Schengen Zone and a threat to their collective identity. Hence, after perceiving the refugees as a threat, the EU bent its policy direction towards Turkey in order to stem the massive influx of refugees in the Turkish soil. It is interesting here to know whether both parties perceive a securitization of Syrian refugees in a similar vein. By this token, the paper delves into the process and policy in which the EU and Turkey (de)securitize Syrian refugees in 2015-2016. Though there are arguments that Turkey did not apparently apply securitization of Syrian refugees on a political agenda, critics maintain that its border practices demonstrated otherwise (Korkut, 2016; Toğral, 2015). It remains a puzzle that if Turkey did not aim to securitize Syrian refugees, what can be used to explain her border practices and her intensive engagement with the EU in 2015? And will Turkey be reliable for the EU to help stem the refugees and protect the Schengen Area? According to the game theory, it would be more rational for Turkey to defect if Syrian refugees are not viewed as a securitized issue. Similarly, EU would consider cheating if the refugees’ influx remained burgeoning. Though role of institution is important to solve prisoners’ dilemma but to what extent a divergence/convergence of the policy orientation such as perception of a common security – particularly Syrian refugees as an existential threat – was significant to their relations? Cebeci (2014, p. 54), for instance, contents that their differences of security culture did not significantly affect the cooperation, but also paradoxically demonstrates that they, at one point, came to securitize each other. Whether one is convinced by such argument or not, it appeared that Turkey-EU relations in 2015 was unusual. It is hence important to assess the (de)securitization process undertaken by both parties and unpack the unusual development of the Turkey-EU relations in 2015-2016.

To this end, the paper is divided into five parts. Part one briefly elaborates securitization framework, which was developed by the Copenhagen and the Paris School. It
concentrates on the securitization formation by tracking a policy development ranging from a public issue to a successful securitization. In this sense, it can be seen as a matter of degree. Part two provides background and context of Turkey-EU relations in the context of Syrian refugee crisis. Part three delves into the EU’s securitization of Syrian refugees by showing that the EU had securitized the issue through the speech and practice act. In part four, the paper will focus on the way in which Turkey desecuritize Syrian refugees by arguing that its border practices was not set for the purpose of combating the refugees but as a part of policy transfer from the EU and the counterterrorism. In the final part, I will give a concise comparative analysis based on five common points, which can be classified into a context, actor, process, policy output, and audience. A brief recommendation will be provided in the conclusion.

Securitization Framework

In order to approach security studies in IR, there are a number of pathways one can employ to tap into a question of what is the most importance for a survival of states and individuals. The focus of different approaches is diverse depending on their epistemology, methodology, and ontology. In this paper, I take the constructivist approach to delve into a process of securitization on Syrian refugees by comparing the securitizing move of the EU and Turkey. In general, constructivism views an object of study as an outcome of social construction. Unlike positivists and objectivists, critical constructivists do not simply view an object of study (such as threat, identity, and anarchy) as something ‘out there’ to be discovered but it is rather, as coined by Wendt (1992), ‘what states make of it’, which focus on a discourse and how narrative of threats becomes securitized in a certain context by relevant actors (McDonald, 2012, 63). By this token, Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde (1998, 30-31) elaborate that the Copenhagen School takes a medium stand between objectivism (real threat) and subjectivism (perceived threat) in a post-positivist epistemology and clarifies that its approach is an intersubjectivity (mutual constructed threat among actors). Thus, in order for securitization to be considered successful, different actors and audiences have to accept it in a similar meaning and among themselves so that the issue at hand is viewed as securitized because a common existential threat is presented and some extraordinary measures are needed to deal with such threat. In short, to put Wendt (1992)’s argument in a different fashion, securitization is what political actors (policymakers) make of it.

Besides, securitization can be seen as a process of making public problems become hyper-politicized beyond a scope of public policy (see Figure 1). In the public policy process, when a public issue becomes part of ‘windows of opportunity’ for an agenda-setting, as Kingdon (2002) suggests, it can be found through 3 streams of policy analysis, which can be characterized by problem stream, policy stream, and political stream (Béland & Howlett, 2016, p. 222). This normal channel of public policy process can be seen as a routine of policy decision making and policy discourse because, in everyday politics, a number of public problems are rampant. The irony in the decision-making process is that public problems
need to be prioritized in order to secure budget, attention, and relevant resources. This is the point in which the securitization moves the issue at hand to the top of the political agenda in term of urgency and significance. Hence, once an existential threat is securitized, authorities or ‘security professionals’, to use Bigo (2002)’s term, is legitimate to implement extraordinary measures in order to manage such threats without critical questioning. In this sense, it can be summarized that securitization works through the speech act by securitizing actors with emergency measures in order to preserve referent objects and be accepted by relevant audiences (Buzan et al., 1998; Leonard, 2007; McDonald, 2012).

However, the Copenhagen School’s contribution is not without limitations. Mainly, this approach has been criticized of having a western-centric conception, the narrow conceptualization of the definition of security, artificial and sharp dichotomy between politicization and securitization, and a negligence of practice act (Bigo, 2002, 194; Buzan et al., 1998, 28; Leonard, 2007, 12-13). In this regard, Bigo (2002, 194) argues that “It is possible to securitize certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as all form of discourse”. Hence, in this sense, in order to frame securitization in a more comprehensive way, it is important to fill the gap of what the Copenhagen School has left its footprint by including ‘practice act’ as a mobilizing force of securitization. In the same token, Leonard (2002, 65-66) contends that a combination of speech act and practice act would give analysts a practical framework to understand more holistically on how securitization takes place the way it is. Importantly, Bigo (2002) also further argues that the securitization of immigration is derived from the interplay between a degree of successful speech acts of
political leaders, their security agenda mobilization, administrative practices, and a specific habitus of the ‘security professional’. Thus, the combination of the Copenhagen School and the Paris School would strengthen a constructivist approach and lay a stronger ground for analysts to understand the process of securitization in a comprehensive and deepening way.\(^1\)

Hence, when look at the securitization formation, it can be perceived that security is a matter of degree.\(^2\) The Copenhagen School is significant in the sense that it creates a minimalist definition of securitization and sets out a threshold of what it means to be securitized. On the other side, the Paris School contributes to the literature in the way that it develops the framework by its criticisms and provides criteria for discursive securitization (elements of what does it mean to be securitized practically). Hence, the degree of securitization can be seen, for instance, by looking at the way in which the Turkish government securitizes Kurdish Questions in the southeastern Turkey on the one case and the way in which the Thai government securitizes Pat(t)ani question in the southern Thailand on the other case. Specifically, it can be perceived that while in Turkey the Kurdish issue is securitized as a terrorism, in Thailand however the Pat(t)ani unrest is framed as a separatist movement, though both cases can be defined as a similar sort of a security problem. Though securitization can be located in the field of public policy and policy analysis discourse, but to distinguish between politicization and politics of exception it is placed beyond the scope of routine politics. To develop this line of argument, it would be interesting, however, to analyze whether the mobility of Syrian refugees in 2015 are viewed as a matter of degree in a similar way mentioned above when we discuss the way in which Turkey and the EU manage the ongoing forced migration issue. Before moving to discuss the comparative case, next section provides context and background of Syrian refugee crisis in relation to Turkey and the EU.

**Context and Background**

History has always been treated as an important source for political analysis. In order to have a rational sense of the case, this section demonstrates dynamics of Turkey-EU relations concerning the mobility of Syrian refugees. The EU-Turkey relations can be traced back to the Ankara agreement of 1963, which was noted as a starting point of their official contact (Ministry for EU Affairs, 2015). The important stage had nevertheless taken place in 1999 when Turkey had been rendered a status of the EU candidate. Prior to the coming of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, it was revealed that Turkey’s goal of becoming the EU member had constantly been put forward and their willingness to comply with EU requirements had never been given up.

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1. Togral (2015) notes that the focus on the role of practices has been emphasized by the Foucauldian approach, which associated with Bigo from the so-called Paris School of Security Studies, and a sociological approach, which is associated with Huysmans and Balzacq.

2. This is similar to Williams (2003, 521)’s argument on the process of intensification, Sirkeci (2009)’s model, and Abrahamsen’s argument (2005, 59). John Kerry also expresses it in the same line of analysis (AFP, 2016).
After 2002, in order for Turkey to qualify as a full member of the EU, AKP passed series of constitutional amendments and harmonization packages, which aimed at democratization reforms (Aknur, 2012, 45). As a result of these efforts the EU lunched the accession negotiation with Turkey in 2005. However, under the leadership of AKP at the same period, it paradoxically appears that Turkey had shifted a strategy of its foreign policy towards Middle East at the expense of its European image and identity. This can be seen by a hostile rhetoric to the West inflamed by the current President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his administration (Akyol, 2015). Even on the occasion of the 2015 Paris March when world leaders rallied for solidarity against terror attack, Davutoğlu was not very well perceived and welcomed by Western media and leaders. In the same vein, Erdoğağan appeared on the news accusing the West as hypocrisy over Paris Attack (Yackley, 2015). To put the matter more complicated, Turkey had, on the other sides, been accused of acting as a gateway for Muslim jihadists to transit to Syria and join Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Vick, 2015). Turkey prior to 2015 seems to be perceived as “other” to the European identity according to European media. Even though, some analysts claim that Turkey was a significant partner for the EU in term of trade by contributing 129,013 million euro in 2014, securing the EU’s top five in export markets (European Commission, 2015a), its identity still appeared to be ‘other’ according to the EU community (Hakura, 2011; Vick, 2015). However, the EU’s policy towards Turkey surprisingly turned to be in a constructive and friendly shape lately. Until mid-2015 Turkey-EU relations had significantly changed to a positive direction and had been seen in a different pattern of interaction. The EU authorities expressed their willingness to cooperate with Turkey in many fronts, portraying Turkey as a real strategic partner and good friend (European Council, 2015). In the same way, Turkish foreign policy towards the EU had also emphasized on many levels of international cooperation. What was happening behind the scene, what were the conditions that turn things upside down? Undoubtedly, a new pattern of interaction between the two parties in 2015 cannot be comprehended without turning attention to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Syrian refugee crisis marked a historic milestone of catastrophe not only for Turkey and the EU but also to the society of states at large. It is reported that till 2015 more than 4 million Syrians had fled their homes to seek a safe haven and better life in their neighboring countries as well as Europe (UNHCR, 2015). In 2015 Turkey alone had received more than 2.4 million Syrian refugees since the outbreak of Syrian civil war in 2011 (Güldoğan, 2015). As the statistic checked from UNHCR (2016) on 2 June 2016, the total persons of concern in Turkey was 2,744,915 and it continues to increase in the months to come. It is, hence, important to note that the year 2015 was an event of an unprecedented wave of Syrian refugees coming to Turkey and the EU. Figure 2 shows that a dramatic change in number of the refugees coming to Turkey appears evidently from a period of 4 months between 2th September (840,171 persons) to 31th December 2014 (1,622,839 persons). This means that within that
period the number of persons of concern was around 700 thousands increased, which was more than two third of its total number in 4 years from its inception. Needless to say, the sudden and massive influx of the refugees to Turkey caused policymakers in Turkey and the EU to reconsider their migration policy with unease and anxiety.

Figure 2 Change in number of Syrian refugees into Turkey in late 2014

The more the Syrian refugees get crossed to Turkey, the more they are likely to move to the EU. Such relationship had made Turkey become the main entry for Syrians to pass to European countries. The fact is that over 1 million refugees already spread out to Europe in an unparalleled wave in 2015 and most of them were Syrians (Clayton & Holland, 2015). It was reported that, by the end of 2015, 63,000 refugees had already reached Greece through Turkey by sea route (BBC, 2015a), while total number of 818,654 refugees in Greece were ready to make their way to other European countries (BBC, 2015b). This phenomenon had undeniably affected relations between Turkey and the EU directly, though the EU did not experience the first-hand crisis similar to Turkey. More significantly, it also posed a security concern to both sides on how to handle the refugee crisis in an appropriate and morally acceptable way.

In order to deal with the crisis in an international system, Turkey and the EU had been attempting to share a burden and the ‘perceived misgivings’ through series of political and diplomatic means. Though the official meetings on the refugee crisis between both sides had been made regularly on diplomatic events such as the 53rd EU-Turkey Association Council on 18th May 2015 and UN General Assembly on 29th September 2015 but the serious and increasing volume of their communication formally started from 15th October 2015 when they released the Joint Action Plan. Since then, their intensive communications on the crisis have been emphasized by a number of high level official meetings, which include (1) G20 Summit on 11th November 2015, (2) EU-Turkey Meeting on 29th November 2015, (3) Turkey-EU Summit on 7th March 2016, and (4) EU council meeting with Turkey on 18th March 2016. In addition to these, there are other important meetings, such as the visit of Merkel before Turkish snap election on 1st November 2015 (Candar, 2015; Yetkin, 2015), that gives significant political meaning to the Turkish politics and the EU–Turkey relations.
important to note that their solemn engagement embarked after the dead body of the three-year-old Kurdish Syrian, Alan Kurdi, was found on the Bodrum beach, which had sparked the international outcry from 2nd September 2015 (Yazgan, Utku, & Sirkeci, 2015, p. 182).

According to the 2016 Turkey-EU deal, Turkey was entitled to receive an initial 3 billion Euro financial assistance plus visa liberalization, and opening new chapters of the remaining EU community acquis in exchange of the readmission agreement and a policy of containing Syrian refugee within Turkish soil (European Council, 2016). Subsequently, the situation, however, seems to be uncertain after the resignation of Ahmet Davutoğlu from the leadership on 5th May 2016. Under the new premiership of Binali Yildirim, the policy orientation towards the EU appeared contentious as the new Minister for the EU affairs vowed “EU is not the sole option” (Hurriyet, 2016), but the way in which Turkish government dealt with Syrian refugees stayed unchanged. However, it suffices to put it here in general that from the ‘open-door policy’ to the containment measures was a recent development of Turkish policy towards Syrian refugees. Meanwhile, the EU was organizing itself around the interplay of securitization, buck passing, and humanitarianism. The next two sections will offer a discussion on the EU’s securitization of the Syrian refugee and the way in which Turkey dealt with the issue from (de)securitization framework respectively. I will then give a comparative analysis of the both case in the section that follows.

The EU’s Securitization of Syrian Refugees

The debate, which took place largely before 2015, on whether the securitization of migration in the EU after 9/11 is a legitimate claim can hardly reach consensus among scholars of critical security studies (Boswell, 2007; Huysmans, 2000; Squire, 2015; Van Munster, 2009). However, recent studies on Syrian refugee crisis since 2015 shows that the securitization of Syrian refugees in the EU member states is apparently evidenced by the speech and practice acts (Gigitashvili, 2016; Karamanidou, 2015; Kinacioglu, 2016; Skleparis, 2016). But, when did Syrian refugees become a public issue and perceive as a threat to the European countries? As the Figure 2 showed, the number of the Syrian refugees started to increase dramatically at the end of 2014 (UNHCR, 2016). From April 2011 to April 2016, the total number of Syrian asylum applications was at 1,037,760, while in 2015 alone the number unprecedentedly reached 846,779 (UNHCR, 2016b). In this connection, Yazgan, Utku, & Sirkeci (2015, 183) argue that the schedule to implement the readmission agreement in 2016, which signed by the EU and Turkey in 2014, played a role in stimulating the mobility in 2015 because once it is in force the late-comers would be sent back to Turkey. Combining between land and sea routes to the

4 It is arguably so because it anchors with the particularist deontological stand of the moral philosophy, which is difficult to be changed at the deeper layer of the ideology. Once the principles and values changes it will have multiple effects including a legitimacy deficit.
5 In the meantime, it is however unclear yet whether the EU is moving to desecuritize the issue.
European countries, this massive number had enough power to frustrate politicians and locals in Europe. The sense of xenophobia and anti-migration started to blow up to the sky urging government to handle the issues with emergency measures such as tear gas, water cannon, fence building and border closing (Human Rights Watch, 2016a). Recently, the issue was tied up in a more complicated way since the migration is linked to terrorism as well as social and economic threats. Hence, it can be said that the issue was significant to the EU not only in term of moral and political concern, but also a security imperative.

It is quite precise not only from an academia but also from the ‘security professionals’ that the EU policy towards the Syrian refugee in 2015 was framed through the securitization. For the EU, the most important concern was the protection of Schengen zone as Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, declared “without control on our external borders, Schengen will become history” (Güldoğan, 2015). Significantly, the securitized phrases such as ‘to protect/safeguard Schengen’ (European Commission, 2015c, 2015d), ‘to combat irregular immigration’ (European Commission, 2015d; The European Union & Turkey, 2014), and ‘to stem’ irregular migration (European Commission, 2016) can openly be found in the EU documents. The EU official, therefore, acknowledged that “the EU is facing an ‘unprecedented crisis’ with ‘unprecedented’ flows of refugees and migrants for which the ‘current system was not designed” (European Migration Network, 2015). While more than 1 million refugees had reached the EU illegally, the EU and its member states’ adopted option was to find immediate actions and that was to stem the their influx by reestablishing internal borders in the Europe and containment of refugees in Turkey (Human Rights Watch, 2016b). Thus, it can be said that protection of the Schengen area from refugees was seen as one of the top policy priorities of the EU in 2015, which widely occupied a place of the political agenda across the EU countries. 7

Hence, looking from the securitization framework, it is seen that the EU was securitizing the influx of Syrian refugees by undertaking many forms of emergency measures such as fences building, border control and closing in order to protect the EU integrity, Schengen principles, and the regional system. More importantly, this vulnerability of Schengen principles led the EU and European countries to worry about the destruction of the Western liberal values upon the arrival of the massive influx of the ‘others’, who were alien to European culture, faith, and values. The authorities, politicians, and masses had mobilized this fear and misgivings through speech act and media in a number of occasions (Barakat & Zyck 2015; Traynor, 2016). Thus, in order to prevent the situation from getting worse the EU turned their policy direction towards Turkey, which resulted in a number of agreements. Significantly, this kind of

6 An analysis of series of news on BBC (2015b, 2016) and Euronews (2016) unveils that Syrian refugee influx had occupied the political agenda in the Western media throughout 2015.

7 European Commission (2015b) uses its website to reveal statements about immediate actions.
engagement implicitly demonstrated the way in which the EU imposed its policy requirement and conditionality upon Turkey, the EU candidate, for the purpose of fulfilling the EU standards. Turkey by no means became a buffer zone between the refugees and the EU. The Table 1 demonstrates elements of the EU’s securitization of Syrian refugees in relations to Turkey in 2015.

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<th>Securitizing actors</th>
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<td>Existential Threat</td>
<td>Influx of Syrian refugees, mainly from Turkey</td>
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<td>Referent object</td>
<td>Schengen, Regional system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speech act</td>
<td>Statements of authorities, political elites to protect/safeguard the Schengen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency measures</td>
<td>Fences-building, Border Check &amp; Control, EU-Turkey Summits, border surveillance (Frontex &amp; Eurosur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Intensive engagements, 2015 Joint Action Plan, 2016 Turkey-EU deal, relocation, readmission, resettlement, financial aids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating conditions</td>
<td>Vulnerability of the Schengen principles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to understand the issue at hand in a wider scope, the Copenhagen School has divided sectors of security into five categories, which can be classified into military, economic, societal, environment, and political sectors. The sector is there to help identify ‘specific type of interaction’ (Buzan et al., 1998, 7). Accordingly, political sector concentrates on nonmilitary threats to political units as well as the protection of system-level referents (Buzan et al, 1998, 171). This is hence in line with the previous argument that the EU was worried about the mobility of Syrian refugees because it not only penetrated into the everyday politics of the locals in its member states, but also the most imperative was the survival of the Schengen itself. In other words, in the political sector, Syrian refugees became an existential threat to the EU because it posed the threat to the regional regime. Systematically, the EU had extended its securitization policy to other third/transit countries, including Turkey, in order to combat irregular immigration (Toğral, 2012, pp. 67–73). This security policy can be seen through the speech act as well as the border practices in a seemingly precise way.

Turkey, Syrian Refugees, and (de)Securitization

An analysis of Turkey’s securitization of the refugees can hardly be straightforward in the lieu of ISIS’s advancement and Syrian Civil War. It was controversial whether securitizing actors under the leadership of AKP had intention to securitize Syrian refugees. Since 2011, Turkish authorities have been using a soft word to call Syrian refugee as a guest instead of...
refugee. This policy orientation appeared to be in such a way partly because, as some argue, the failure of Turkish foreign policy in Syria and hence Turkey was responsible to that cause by accepting the consequences (Sumur, 2013). It was clear that in the beginning of the Syrian crisis Turkey was convincing Assad regime to reform but after it failed, Turkey turned to be the closest opponent to the regime. Turkey then was paying the price for its own past policy with a newer version of open-door policy and at least 8 billion euro of the expenditure as of February 2016 (The Guardian, 2016).

If we observe securitization process according to the Copenhagen School, we will find that AKP was the main actor in controlling the refugee agenda in the country. AKP did not treat the refugees as an existential threat to the national integrity and other relevant referent objects. However, if we observe the way in which Turkish politicians use the speech act, we will not find a security tone of concern regarding Syrian refugees. What one would find was therefore the humanitarian discourse (Davutoğlu, 2013; Toğral, 2015). In this regard, the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (AFAD) maintains that “Had it been a military crisis, this would have been delegated to security forces. However, as this is considered a humanitarian crisis since the first entry on 29 April 2011, AFAD became involved” (Korkut, 2016, p. 10).

However, because humanitarian policy is a short-term strategy and did not help mitigate the way in which the refugees constitute threat to the locals, there was a pressure from a policy stream for the government to deal with the ongoing reality by paying serious attention to a long term policy of integration through education, identity construction, health care, and job market (İçduygu, 2015a; Kanat & Üstün, 2015; Kirişci & Ferris, 2015). As can be seen, though Turkish authorities had no intention to securitize the issue, Turkish people, especially in the southeast Turkey, had to negotiate their lives by their own means with the refugees whether they like it or not. Because securitization is a kind of top-down process, one can hardly depict Syrian refugees as threats to the Turkish national integrity according to the speech acts analysis.

However, it is interesting to take a further step to see whether Turkey did not securitize the issue implicitly. As has been explained earlier that, in addition to the Copenhagen School, Paris School and other sociological approaches share a similar view that securitization can be done discursively. In this token, taking a critical border studies, Kanat & Üstün (2015, p. 12) İçduygu (2015a) and

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8 To term a migrant as a ‘guest’ has a connotation in Islamic political history because Prophet Mohammad was a migrant (muhajir) from Mecca to Medina, who was perceived as a guest. His migration (hijrah) marks the first year of Islamic calendar and the first historical model of Islamic state in 622. However the term ‘guest’ in today’s nation-state system has no legal implication in the national and international law. This causes critics of the current Turkish migration regime.

9 This is even more ironic because, as Bigo (2002) argues, humanitarian discourse can actually be seen as a by-product of securitization.
Toğral (2015) argues that Syrian refugees had been securitized in a security framework mainly through the border practices, which include exclusionary, militarized and technologized border control. In addition, surveys of the perception of the locals about Syrian refugees reveal that majority of Turkish people feel that Syrian refugees negatively impact on their lives and relatively constitute threat (Erbay, 2015, 16; Güldoğan, 2015, 11; Orhan & Gundogar, 2015). Besides, it makes even more sense to see that Turkey had recently employed security measures around the local airports, let alone in the South East Turkey. Thus, according to the Paris School, it may be said that Turkey had securitized Syrian refugees by discursive means. However, it is ironic here to define whether such implementations and practices were a sort of securitization of forced migration or were they as a normal procedure. Thus, it was contrarily argued that these discursive measures were not a natural reaction to Syrian refugees but rather to the terrorists and ISIS (Anadolu Agency, 2015; Hürriyet, 2015). Turkey had a limited resource to deal with all public problems and hence it was impossible to securitize all potential problems. Besides, such kind of securitization adoption was an imposition of the EU, prior to 2015, on Turkey as its candidate to comply with the EU standards and conditionality (Bürgin & Aşikoğlu, 2015; Toğral, 2012). On top of that, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) had released rebuttal to its allegation of violating the principle of non-refoulement by asserting that “Turkey, for over five years, has been implementing the "open door policy" to the Syrians who fled from the war environment in their country and within the frame of its international obligations, abide by the principle of “non-refoulement” meticulously. There is not any change in this attitude.”

Juxtaposed with factors mentioned earlier, what Turkey had done on the border control can, therefore, be interpreted as a counterterrorism and as a policy transfer from the center to the periphery state. Despite all these, Turkey showed no sign to suspend its open door policy though the number of Syrians’ influx was increasing. It appeared that Turkey and the EU did not have a shared referent object and the common existential threat. The next section will demonstrate points of comparison on the different degrees of securitization process.

Securitization of Syrian Refugees between the EU and Turkey: An Uncomfortable Marriage

As has been stated that the EU and Turkey appeared to have a different degree of securitization of Syrian refugee due to the different context they faced. This section is set out to give a comparative analysis on how do the EU and Turkey deal with the issue of Syrian

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10 For instance, in March 2016 this measure had recently been implemented in Izmir Adnan Menderes International Airport (Security officers, personal communication, 20\textsuperscript{10} May, 2016).

11 Within the first 6 months of 2016, terrorists had successfully attacked different places in Turkey for 13 times. This shows the failure of security measures on the one hand and suggests that Turkey needs to prioritize the securitization of terrorism on the other hands.
irregular migration in 2015. To make the discussion parsimonious, I will compare and contrast the cases by concentrating on five common points, which can be characterized by context, agents, the process (securitizing move), policy outcome, and the audience. Firstly, the EU and Turkey lived in a different environment of crisis. While the EU’s location is distant to the point of the conflict, Turkey is the neighbor of Syria and have a more proximate significance not only in term of geopolitics but also historical deepening. Turkey was involved in removing Assad regime from the beginning and its role to maintain the regional power was also important. Based on the salience of the context, Turkey was facing the first-hand experience with the conflict and the refugee crisis, which the EU is not. Besides, Turkey also confronted with many fronts in the war with Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), ISIS, and Syria. This context urged Turkey to weight policy orientations towards the most significant one that posed an existential threat to the national security and, according to my observation, it was not the refugees. Significantly, Turkey viewed Syrian refugees as a guest of the country, meanwhile the EU perceived them as a threat to the regional system and the sociatal security.

Secondly, the size and nature of institution that has ‘a monopoly on the legitimate use of force’, to use Weber (1958)’s term, is significant because it determines an actor’s capacity and its policy outcome. The EU is not a state but a supranational institution, which composed of rich, highly developed, and democratic agencies with Western liberal values (a Christian Club), while Turkey is a nation-state, which is run by AKP and Erdoğan, the Islamists who define themselves as a conservative democrat. In a country where religion and politics was apparently (re)connected like Turkey, collective memory of Islamic values and history plays an influential role in determining criteria for policy decision. Besides, as a de facto one party system, Turkey was more convenient than the EU to use force to combat the refugees, if it deems necessary. However, though both sides stand in a different nature and history of institution, but what brought them together was the EU principles and incentives. As a candidate of the EU member, Turkey was complying with the EU request concerning the Syrian refugees as long as it did not interfere Turkish internal affairs such as Kurdish Question and anti-terrorism law.

Thirdly, when look at the process or securitizing move from the mid-2015 to the beginning of 2016, the EU’s news on Syrian migration occupied the political agenda, while Turkey did not prioritize them as such. Instead, Turkey’s securitization of ISIS and Assad regime’s alliance was more significant than the refugees as it can be seen by its military operation to down Russian jet in November 2015. Hence, it can be perceived that while the EU had securitized the refugee issue, Turkey had done so by politicization under the boundary of public policy. Their speech acts and extraordinary measures seemingly demonstrate a diverent move: the EU expressed with securitized rhetorics and passed the buck to Turkey while some of its members declared state of emergency, Turkey,
on the contrary, used a benign discourse of humanitarianism.

Fourthly, the policy output of the both sides appears to be rather complicated. While the EU wanted to stop a number of the refugees by closing borders, urging relocation, resettlement, readmission scheme and stemming them in the Turkish soil, Turkey recently appeared paradoxically reluctant to make concession to the EU as it was afraid of becoming a buffer zone (Hurriyet, 2016; RT, 2016; SETA Vakfı, 2015), though some deals had been agreed during the leadership of Davutoğlu. Indeed, his resignation explicitly demonstrates tension within Turkish policymakers about the result of political bargaining between Turkey and the EU. However, be that as it may, Turkey persisted to employ the open door policy by issuing Law on Foreigners and International Protection while giving humanitarian aids and building camps. This point of comparison unveils that the EU’s referent object was to protect the Schengen and its regional system, while that of Turkey is the Syrian refugees.

Lastly, because their perception of referent object and threat were different, it appeared that audiences in the both sides were facing a dissimilar reality. While relevant audiences in the EU democratic context sent a negative signal that the refugees had become a red alarm issue (Schetyna, 2015) and were ready to accept securitization, the audiences in Turkey did not have many option but to negotiate their lives with the refugees. Interestingly, majority of audience in Turkey, however, demonstrated acceptance via the snap election on 1 November 2015, which showed that Turkish audiences still supported its open door policy. On the other hands, pro-immigration’s EU state members (such as Germany) were losing the support from their voters (Doyle, 2016).

To put it in a nutshell, this section demonstrated that the EU and Turkey share a policy divergence in securitization more than its similarity (see Table 2). The EU was in favor of securitizing the refugees, while Turkey preferred to locate the issue in the humanitarian discourse. Based on above analysis, since Davutoğlu no longer played a leading role in the office, the recent diplomatic development between Turkey and the EU was affected and hence relations between both sides appeared to be uncertain. It is partly because while the EU decision-making process was rested on a complex and democratic deliberation, Turkish foreign policy was tied significantly with Erdoğan’s perception, preference, and ideology. In the worst scenario, by taking the resignation of Davutoğlu as a lesson, Turkey may withdraw communication, 12–18 October 2015), while in Istanbul a number of Syrian boys and girls, who don’t know Turkish language, go to school but to beg around Fatih District for their survival (observation, 28–29 May 2016). One severely injured Syrian boy and one girl told me in Arabic language at Fatih District, while begging for some helps, that their begging is for the survival of their family (personal communication, 28 May 2016). Similarly seen in Izmir and Istanbul, Syrian female beggars use mosques, especially on Friday, as a focal point for their begging. Though it is a rare case to find Syrian men begging in front of mosques, but I occasionally was approached, while walking on street in Istanbul, by Syrian man with family asking for donation (Fieldwork, 28 May 2016).

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12 For instance, as Syrian refugee outside the camps are outnumbered those who are in, low-cost hotels around Basmane in Izmir are crowded with Syrians (Hotel officers, personal communication, 12–18 October 2015), while in Istanbul a number of Syrian boys and girls, who don’t know Turkish language, go to school but to beg around Fatih District for their survival (observation, 28–29 May 2016). One severely injured Syrian boy and one girl told me in Arabic language at Fatih District, while begging for some helps, that their begging is for the survival of their family (personal communication, 28 May 2016). Similarly seen in Izmir and Istanbul, Syrian female beggars use mosques, especially on Friday, as a focal point for their begging. Though it is a rare case to find Syrian men begging in front of mosques, but I occasionally was approached, while walking on street in Istanbul, by Syrian man with family asking for donation (Fieldwork, 28 May 2016).
from the previous deal if Erdoğan feels intimidated and unfair about how Turkey is played by the EU. However, while there are pressures for Turkey to pay serious attention to a long-term strategy of integration of Syrian refugees, Turkey’s commitment to the humanitarian taskforce from the outset was initiated independently from the EU influence and will remain as a public discourse in Turkish public policy.

**Table 2 EU-Turkey’s (de)Securitization of Syrian Refugees in 2015-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>The EU and its member states</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Syrian refugees</td>
<td>Threat to the regional system</td>
<td>Guest to the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Securitizing actors</td>
<td>The EU and its members (democratic institution)</td>
<td>AKP, Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, AFAD (conservative democrats + Islamists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Referent object</td>
<td>Schengen system/zone</td>
<td>Syrian refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Extraordinary measures/ policy</td>
<td>Fences-building, Border check &amp; control, EU-Turkey Summits, border surveillance</td>
<td>Open door policy, Law on Foreigners and International Protection, humanitarian diplomacy, wall-building, border check &amp; control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Speech act</td>
<td>Collapse of Schengen, declaration of state of emergency, ‘to protect/safeguard the Schengen’, ‘to stem/combat irregular migration’ (Syrians)</td>
<td>Humanitarian discourse, guest of the country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

This paper has demonstrated that the Copenhagen and Paris School of Security Studies have contributed to the body of IR literature significantly and strengthened the way in which we can approach forced migration issue, especially the Syrian refugee crisis. While the former sets out the minimalist definition of securitization, the latter deepens it by expanding the elements of securitization. Securitization can be seen as a degree of intensification rather than as static and linear procedure in mobilizing national resources and extraordinary measures. Once the issue is securitized by speech act it is assumed that securitizing actors and ‘security professionals’, with their top priority, will have a sufficient degree of legitimacy to implement emergent measures. It is argued in the paper that in 2015-2016 the EU has managed to securitize the Syrian refugees, whereas Turkey had contained the agenda to be in between the politicization and securitization. However, incorporation of ‘speech act’ and ‘practice act’, as some argue, can potentially be helpful combination for comparative studies. Accordingly, the cases at hand may be viewed that while the EU and some of its members had explicitly securitized Syrian refugees by the speech act,
Turkey had however implicitly securitized Syrian refugees through the practice act. But in a deeper layer of analysis it conversely shows that the Turkish discursive securitization aimed at combating terrorism (ISIS and PKK plus its alliances) rather than closing its door for the Syrian refugees. Turkey therefore persisted with its open door policy and desecuritization. The study, hence, implies that the divergence of their (de)securitization contributed to the fluctuated development of EU-Turkey relations in 2015-2016 concerning the refugee crisis. EU’s buck passing to Turkey rather than deepening the burden-sharing had discursively been distancing Turkey from being part of the EU identity. This not only demonstrated the otherness of Turkey in the EU’s perception, but also unveiled the power relations between the center and periphery state (buffer zone). As a result of these, the study recommends that humanitarian activists should not feel indifferent with the outcome of the 2016 Turkey-EU deal but to advocate the EU to reconsider an open door policy and speed up the relocation and resettlement instead of securitization.13 Similar vein, they should also encourage Turkey to facilitate safety for the refugees that are on their ways to their destination countries and accelerate integration and resettlement programs instead of locking herself with unhealthy readmission and containment measures that were requested by the EU.

13 This is because securitization is a state-centric approach, which gives legitimacy to authorities to violate, delay, and prevent rights and dignity that refugees are entitled to possess under the moral and international law.
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